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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 Richie Fontaine appeals his conviction in the District 
Court of the Virgin Islands of the United States for 
unauthorized possession of a firearm or “imitation thereof” 
during the commission of a crime of violence, in violation of 
14 V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, § 2253(a).  Fontaine argues that 
§ 2253(a) is void for vagueness and that the government 
failed to prove he was not authorized to possess an 
“imitation” firearm, which, under his interpretation of 
§ 2253(a), it was required to do.  For the following reasons, 
we will affirm the judgment of conviction. 
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I. Background 
 
 A. Facts 
 
  On the night of August 14, 2009, Yully Geron and 
Julio Martinez were driving in St. Thomas, when Fontaine 
and an unidentified companion1
 
 forced them to stop and get 
out of their car.  Fontaine was brandishing what appeared to 
be a black handgun, while his companion had what appeared 
to be a silver handgun.  After Geron and Martinez got out of 
the car, Fontaine and his accomplice ordered them to lie on 
the ground.  Fontaine’s accomplice proceeded to search 
Martinez and took his wallet, jewelry, and cell phone, while 
Fontaine searched Geron and took his wallet and a steel 
bracelet.  Fontaine then held his gun – or what appeared to be 
a gun – to Martinez’s head, and asked him “[w]here is the 
money.”  (Joint App. at 180.)  Making the threat explicit, 
Fontaine said, “I am going to count until three.  And if you 
don’t give me your money, I’m going to kill you.”  (Id.)  At 
some point, Fontaine pulled the trigger, but the gun did not 
fire.  Fontaine also demanded money from Geron.  Martinez 
told Fontaine that Fontaine’s accomplice, who had by then 
walked across the street, had the money.  Fontaine then 
departed.  Martinez and Geron immediately drove to a police 
station and reported the incident.  Fontaine was arrested nine 
days later.   Law enforcement authorities never recovered the 
gun (real or imitation) that was in Fontaine’s possession when 
he robbed Martinez and Geron. 
                                              
1 The police never located Fontaine’s accomplice, and 
his identity is unknown.   
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 B. Procedural History 
 
 On October 1, 2009, the government charged Fontaine 
with, among other things, six counts of unauthorized 
possession of a firearm or “imitation thereof” during the 
commission of a crime of violence, in violation of 14 V.I. 
Code Ann. tit. 14, § 2253(a).2
                                              
 2 Section 2253(a) provides: 
  Because law enforcement 
authorities did not recover a gun when they apprehended 
Fontaine and so could not prove that he had possessed an 
operable firearm, the government’s theory of the case was 
that Fontaine possessed an “imitation” firearm when he 
committed the crimes for which he was being prosecuted.   
Whoever, unless otherwise authorized by law, 
has, possesses, bears, transports or carries 
either, actually or constructively, openly or 
concealed any firearm, as defined in Title 23, 
section 451(d) of this code, loaded or unloaded, 
may be arrested without a warrant, and shall be 
sentenced to imprisonment of not less than one 
year nor more than five years and shall be fined 
not less than $5,000 nor more than $15,000 or 
both the fine and imprisonment, except that if 
such person shall have been convicted of a 
felony in any state, territory, or federal court of 
the United States, or if such firearm or an 
imitation thereof was had, possessed, borne, 
transported or carried by or under the proximate 
control of such person during the commission 
or attempted commission of a crime of violence, 
as defined in subsection (d) hereof, then such 
person shall be fined $25,000 and imprisoned 
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not less than fifteen (15) years nor more than 
twenty (20) years. The foregoing applicable 
penalties provided for violation of this section 
shall be in addition to the penalty provided for 
the commission of, or attempt to commit, the 
felony or crime of violence. 
 14 V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, § 2253(a). 
The details of the indictment are as follows.  Count 
One charged Fontaine with receipt of a firearm by a person 
under indictment, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(n).  Counts 
Two and Eight charged him with first degree robbery, in 
violation of 14 V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, §§ 1861, 1862(2), and 
11(a).  Counts Four and Ten charged Fontaine with second 
degree robbery, in violation of 14 V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, 
§§ 1861 and 1863(1).  Counts Six and Twelve charged 
Fontaine with first degree assault, in violation of 14 V.I. Code 
Ann. tit. 14, §§ 295(3) and 11(a).  The statute at issue here 
figures in Counts Three, Five, Seven, Nine, Eleven, and 
Thirteen, which charged Fontaine with unauthorized 
possession of a firearm or “imitation thereof” during the 
commission of a crime of violence, in violation of 14 V.I. 
Code Ann. tit. 14, §§ 2253(a) and 11(a), in connection with 
each of the aforementioned offenses.  Count Three charged 
Fontaine with violating § 2253 in connection with the first 
degree robbery of Geron charged in Count Two.  Count Five 
charged Fontaine with violating § 2253(a) in connection with 
the second degree robbery of Geron charged in Count Four.  
Count Seven charged Fontaine with violating § 2253(a) in 
connection with the conduct that gave rise to Count Six, 
which alleges that Fontaine assaulted Geron with the intent to 
commit robbery.  Count Nine charges Fontaine with violating 
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 Trial commenced on November 16, 2009.  At the close 
of the government’s case-in-chief, Fontaine filed a motion for 
a judgment of acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 29.3
                                                                                                     
§ 2253(a) in connection with the first degree robbery of 
Martinez charged in Count Eight.  Count Eleven charges 
Fontaine with violating § 2253(a) in connection with the 
second degree robbery of Martinez charged in Count Ten.  
Count Thirteen charges Fontaine with violating § 2253(a) in 
connection with the conduct that gave rise to Count Twelve, 
which alleges that Fontaine assaulted Martinez with the intent 
to commit robbery. 
  The District Court initially denied the motion 
but then became “concerned that the counts that charge the 
possession of a firearm during a crime of violence may have 
an elemental proof issue.”  (Joint App. at 311.)  The Court 
3 Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(a) provides: 
After the government closes its evidence or 
after the close of all the evidence, the court on 
the defendant’s motion must enter a judgment 
of acquittal of any offense for which the 
evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction. 
The court may on its own consider whether the 
evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction. 
If the court denies a motion for a judgment of 
acquittal at the close of the government’s 
evidence, the defendant may offer evidence 
without having reserved the right to do so. 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(a). 
 
 
7 
 
was apparently concerned that § 2253(a), as written, required 
the government to prove that the defendant did not have 
authorization to possess an imitation firearm.  (See id. at 320 
(“And the way the statute is written, or the way it’s been 
determined to be … you have to show that there was no 
license to possess [an imitation firearm].”); id. (“If you can’t 
get a license to possess a toy gun, say one you got at Kmart 
that looks like a real gun, can you really establish that 
[element of the offense]?”).)  The Court thus instructed the 
parties to submit additional briefing on the issue.   
 
 Before definitively resolving that issue, the District 
Court instructed the jury that, for the government to sustain 
its burden of proving that Fontaine was guilty of unauthorized 
possession of a firearm or imitation thereof during a crime of 
violence,   
 
the government must prove the following 
essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt:  
[f]irst, that the defendant committed a crime of 
violence; [s]econd, that during the commission 
of that crime the defendant knowingly 
possessed or carried a firearm, or imitation 
thereof; [and] [t]hird, that the defendant was not 
authorized to possess or carry the firearm or 
imitation thereof. 
 
(Id. at 345.)  Based on that instruction, the jury found 
Fontaine guilty on five of the six counts charging a violation 
of § 2253(a).4
                                              
 4 The jury returned a verdict of not guilty on Count 
Seven.   
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 Thereafter, the Court denied Fontaine’s Rule 29 
motion.  In denying the motion, it held “that the language [of 
§ 2253] is clear enough to put those in the community on 
notice [as to] which crimes are penalized, [and] what type of 
conduct is prohibited.”  (Id. at 474.)  The Court also held that, 
except to the extent of showing a defendant was a convicted 
felon, § 2253(a) did not require the government to show that 
Fontaine was not authorized to possess a firearm or “imitation 
thereof” in order to prove that he was guilty of “possessing … 
an imitation firearm during the commission of a crime of 
violence.”5
                                              
5 In reaching that post-trial conclusion, the Court 
adopted the reading of § 2253(a) proposed by the government 
in its brief.  (See Joint App. at 474-75 (stating that “the 
reading … the Government outlined in its papers is the one 
that the Court will adopt in this case”).)  The government 
paraphrased § 2253(a) as follows: 
  V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, § 2253(a).  Fontaine was 
Whoever has posses [sic], bears, transports or 
carries either, actually or constructively, openly 
or concealed any firearm, as defined in Title 23, 
section 451(d) of this code, loaded or unloaded, 
may be arrested without a warrant. 
[The person] shall be sentenced to 
imprisonment of not less than one year nor 
more than five years and shall be fined not less 
than $5,000 nor more than $15,000 or both the 
fine and imprisonment. 
[Additionally,] if [the] person [was] convicted 
of a felony in any state, territory, or federal 
court of the United States, or if [a] firearm or 
imitation thereof was had, possessed, borne, 
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transported or carried by or under the proximate 
control of [a convicted felon] during the 
commission or attempted commission of a 
crime of violence, then [the convicted felon] 
shall be fined $25,000 and imprisoned not less 
than fifteen (15) years nor more than twenty 
(20) years. 
The foregoing applicable penalties provided for 
violation of this section shall be in addition to 
the penalty provided for the commission of, or 
attempt to commit, the felony or crime of 
violence. 
(Id. at 107-08.)  Thus, while it is not entirely clear, it appears 
that, under the District Court’s and the government’s 
interpretation of the statute, the government could show a 
defendant was a convicted felon but would not otherwise 
have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant 
accused of possessing an imitation firearm in the course of a 
violent crime was not authorized to possess a firearm or an 
imitation firearm.  In other words, to the extent the universe 
of persons “not otherwise authorized by law” to carry a 
firearm contains non-felons, cf. V.I. Code Ann. tit. 23, § 454 
(providing that "[a] firearm may be lawfully had, possessed, 
borne, transported or carried in the Virgin Islands by the 
following persons, provided a license for such purpose has 
been issued by the Commissioner in accordance with the 
provisions of this chapter ... ."), it seems the government and 
the District Court would not require proof of a lack of 
authorization as to those individuals. 
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subsequently sentenced to sixty months’ imprisonment on 
Count One; fifteen years’ imprisonment on Counts Three, 
Five, Nine, Eleven, and Thirteen; and fifteen years’ 
imprisonment on Counts Eight, Ten, and Twelve.  All counts 
were to be served concurrently.  This timely appeal followed. 
 
II. Discussion6
 
 
 Fontaine appeals his conviction on two grounds:  
first, he argues that his conviction under § 2253(a) is 
unconstitutional because the statute is unconstitutionally 
vague; second, he argues that the government failed to 
satisfy its burden of proving that he is guilty of violating 
§ 2253(a) because it did not offer any evidence that he is 
                                                                                                     
 That interpretation is at odds with the instructions that 
the Court gave to the jury.  In particular, as noted above, the 
Court instructed the jury that the government bore the burden 
of proving that “the defendant was not authorized to possess 
or carry [a] firearm or imitation thereof.”  (Id. at 345.)  
Despite any inconsistency, however, there appears to be no 
dispute that the government offered evidence that Fontaine 
did not have authorization to possess a firearm.  (See 
Appellees’ Br. at 14 (noting that “evidence was produced that 
Fontaine did not possess a firearm license”); Appellant’s Br. 
at 9 (asking whether government could demonstrate that 
Fontaine did not have authorization to carry an imitation 
firearm “by establishing that he did not possess a firearms 
license.”).)   
 6 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231 and 48 U.S.C. § 1612.  We have jurisdiction pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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not authorized to possess an imitation firearm.  We will 
uphold the conviction because § 2253(a) clearly proscribes 
Fontaine’s conduct in this case, and because, sensibly read, 
it requires only that the government prove that an accused 
is not authorized to possess a firearm, not that it prove a 
lack of authorization to carry an imitation firearm. 
 
 A. The Void-For-Vagueness Challenge7
 
 
 As previously noted, supra note 2, Section 2253(a) 
provides: 
 
Whoever, unless otherwise authorized by law, 
has, possesses, bears, transports or carries 
either, actually or constructively, openly or 
concealed any firearm, as defined in Title 23, 
section 451(d) of this code,[8
                                              
 7 We review “challenges to the constitutionality of a 
statute under a de novo standard of review.”  United States v. 
Fullmer, 584 F.3d 132, 151 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).   
] loaded or 
unloaded, may be arrested without a warrant, 
and shall be sentenced to imprisonment of not 
less than one year nor more than five years and 
shall be fined not less than $5,000 nor more 
8 V.I. Code Ann. tit. 23, § 451(d) defines a firearm as 
“any device by whatever name known, capable of discharging 
ammunition by means of gas generated from an explosive 
composition, including any air gas or spring gun or any ‘BB’ 
pistols or ‘BB’ guns that have been adapted or modified to 
discharge projectiles as a firearm.” 
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than $15,000 or both the fine and imprisonment, 
except that if such person shall have been 
convicted of a felony in any state, territory, or 
federal court of the United States, or if such 
firearm or an imitation thereof was had, 
possessed, borne, transported or carried by or 
under the proximate control of such person 
during the commission or attempted 
commission of a crime of violence, as defined in 
subsection (d) hereof, then such person shall be 
fined $25,000 and imprisoned not less than 
fifteen (15) years nor more than twenty (20) 
years. The foregoing applicable penalties 
provided for violation of this section shall be in 
addition to the penalty provided for the 
commission of, or attempt to commit, the felony 
or crime of violence. 
 
(emphasis added).  And again, as noted, the jury found 
Fontaine guilty of possessing a firearm or imitation firearm 
“during the commission or attempted commission of a crime 
of violence … .”  V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, § 2253(a).  Fontaine 
contends that § 2253(a) is void for vagueness because, by 
penalizing those who possess an imitation firearm during a 
crime of violence, it “fails to provide people of ordinary 
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to understand what 
conduct it prohibits and authorizes,” and “encourages 
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”  (Appellant’s Br. 
at 7, 8.)  We disagree. 
 
 The void-for-vagueness doctrine reflects the 
fundamental principle that, in order to comply with the 
requirements of due process, a statute must give fair warning 
13 
 
of the conduct that it prohibits.  See Bouie v. City of 
Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 351 (1964) (“We have recognized 
… that a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of 
an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence 
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its 
application violates the first essential of due process of law … 
.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).  A statute 
is unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause if it 
“(1) ‘fails to provide people of ordinary intelligence a 
reasonable opportunity to understand what conduct it 
prohibits’; or (2) ‘authorizes or even encourages arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement.’”  United States v. Stevens, 533 
F.3d 218, 249 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Hill v. Colorado, 530 
U.S. 703, 732 (2000)).  “In criminal cases, because vagueness 
attacks are based on lack of notice, they may be overcome in 
any specific case where reasonable persons would know their 
conduct puts [them] at risk of punishment under the statute.”  
United States v. Moyer, 674 F.3d 192, 211 (3d Cir. 2012) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  Where, as 
here, a statute does not involve rights guaranteed by the First 
Amendment,9
                                              
9 In the context of a case arising under the First 
Amendment, “we are concerned with the vagueness of the 
statute ‘on its face’ because such vagueness may in itself 
deter constitutionally protected and socially desirable 
conduct.”  United States v. Nat’l Dairy Prods. Corp., 372 
U.S. 29, 36 (1963) (citation omitted). 
 we examine whether it is vague “as-applied to 
the affected party.”  United States v. Fullmer, 584 F.3d 132, 
152 (3d Cir. 2009); see also United States v. Mazurie, 419 
U.S. 544, 550 (1975) (“It is well established that vagueness 
challenges to statutes which do not involve First Amendment 
14 
 
freedoms must be examined in the light of the facts of the 
case at hand.” (citation omitted)).      
 
 Fontaine’s void-for-vagueness challenge fails because 
§ 2253(a) is abundantly clear as applied to his conduct in this 
case.  As previously described, the statute prohibits the 
possession of an imitation firearm during the commission of a 
crime of violence.  V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, § 2253(a).  
Although it does not define the term “imitation,” the plain and 
ordinary meaning of that term is “something produced as a 
copy,” and it shares the same Latin root as the verb “imitate,” 
which means “to be or appear like.”10
                                              
10 In determining whether a statute is 
unconstitutionally vague, we apply the canons of statutory 
construction.  See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 932 F.2d 
1085, 1090 (5th Cir. 1991) (applying “fundamental” canon of 
construction “that, unless otherwise defined, words will be 
interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common 
meaning” in assessing vagueness challenge (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted)); Vernon Beigay, Inc. v. 
Traxler, 790 F.2d 1088, 1093 (4th Cir. 1986) (same).  Thus, 
where a statutory term “is not defined in the statute, we must 
construe the term ‘in accordance with its ordinary or natural 
meaning.’”  United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350, 
357 (1994) (quoting FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 476 
(1994)); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 431 (2000) (“We 
give the words of a statute their ordinary, contemporary, 
common meaning, absent an indication Congress intended 
them to bear some different import.” (internal quotation 
marks and citations omitted)). 
  Webster’s Collegiate 
Dictionary, 10th ed. (2002).  Thus, § 2253(a) imposes 
punishment on anyone who, while committing or attempting 
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to commit a crime of violence, possesses an object that is 
“produced as a copy” of, or “appear[s] like,” a firearm.  
During the trial, both Martinez and Geron testified that 
Fontaine brandished a black object they recognized as a gun 
when he robbed them.  In fact, Fontaine held it to Martinez’s 
head and pulled the trigger.  There is no question that a 
person of ordinary intelligence would have fair warning that 
an object that appears to be a handgun is an “imitation” 
firearm under § 2253(a), and that using it to threaten murder 
during a robbery violates the law.  Therefore, because a 
person of ordinary intelligence would understand that the 
statute proscribes Fontaine’s conduct in this case, it is not 
unconstitutionally vague.11
                                              
11 We also reject in short order Fontaine’s argument 
that § 2253(a) encourages arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement because “if a thief carried a green, plastic water 
pistol while stealing $101 from a victim, section 2253 
authorizes his prosecution … .”  (Appellant’s Br. at 9.)  As 
already noted, a statute is unconstitutionally vague if it 
“authorize[s] and even encourage[s] arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement,” City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 
U.S. 41, 56 (1999), by failing to “establish minimal 
guidelines to govern law enforcement,” Kolender v. Lawson, 
461 U.S. 352, 368 (1983) (citation omitted).  Section 2253(a) 
does provide adequate “guidelines to govern enforcement.”  It 
expressly allows territorial authorities to prosecute a person 
only when that person commits a crime of violence while 
possessing an object that is a copy of, or appears to be, a 
firearm.  The fact that a thief who carries something that 
looks like a real firearm while committing a crime of violence 
falls within the statute’s sweep does not mean that the statute 
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B. The Demand for Proof of Unauthorized 
Possession of an Imitation Firearm12
 
 
 Fontaine also argues that, even if we determine that 
§ 2253(a) is not unconstitutionally vague, we should reverse 
his conviction because, under that statute, the government had 
the burden of proving that he was not authorized to possess an 
imitation firearm, and it failed to do so.  He is, however, 
mistaken in his premise about the meaning of § 2253(a). 
 
 “A court’s primary purpose in statutory interpretation 
is to discern legislative intent.”  Morgan v. Gay, 466 F.3d 
276, 277 (3d Cir. 2006).  In determining legislative intent, 
“[t]he plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive, 
except in … rare cases in which the literal application of a 
statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the 
intentions of its drafters.”  United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 
Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) (internal quotation marks and 
                                                                                                     
encourages enforcement against people who have something 
which, like a green water pistol, is obviously not a firearm.   
 12 We exercise plenary review of a district court’s 
interpretation of a statute.  Gibbs v. Cross, 160 F.3d 962, 964 
(3d Cir. 1998).  Because Fontaine’s appeal requires us to 
interpret a territorial law, it is our role to predict how the 
Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands would resolve this 
interpretive issue.  See Edwards v. HOVENSA, LLC, 497 F.3d 
355, 361 n.3 (3d Cir. 2007) (stating that, with the 
establishment of the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands, 
federal courts are now tasked with “predict[ing] how the 
Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands would decide an issue of 
territorial law”). 
17 
 
citation omitted).  In those rare cases, we are obligated “to 
construe statutes sensibly and avoid constructions which yield 
absurd or unjust results.”  United States v. McKie, 112 F.3d 
626, 631 (3d Cir. 1997); see also In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 
661, 667 (1897) (“[N]othing is better settled than that statutes 
should receive a sensible construction, such as will effectuate 
the legislative intention, and, if possible, so as to avoid an 
unjust or an absurd conclusion.”).  Thus, as we explained in 
Government of the Virgin Islands v. Berry, 604 F.2d 221 (3d 
Cir. 1979), when necessary, “[g]eneral terms should be so 
limited in their application as not to lead to … an absurd 
consequence,” and we should “presume[] that the legislature 
intended exceptions to its language, which would avoid 
[absurd]” results.  Id. at 225 (quoting United States v. Kirby, 
74 U.S. 482, 486-87 (1868)); see, e.g., United States v. 
Carson, 455 F.3d 336, 385 n.44 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (reaching 
“common sense conclusion” that, despite the language of the 
statute, the violent crimes in aid of racketeering statute “[did] 
not permit a fine to be levied in lieu of imprisonment or 
death”); Chesapeake Ranch Water Co. v. Bd. of Comm’rs of 
Calvert Cnty., 401 F.3d 274, 280 (4th Cir. 2005) (declining to 
adopt interpretation of federal statute that “once a water 
association is granted authority to serve some area—no matter 
how small—it could then expand its monopoly indefinitely by 
simply developing the physical capability to serve locations 
beyond its original franchise area”); Coar v. Kazimir, 990 
F.2d 1413, 1423-24 (3d Cir. 1993) (rejecting interpretation of 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act that would permit 
“dishonest trustees … ‘who repeatedly and indeed blatantly 
breached their fiduciary duties to … pension plan’ to evade 
their obligations,” and result in “[p]lan members and their 
families [having] to watch their pension monies disappear 
into the [dishonest trustees’] pockets” (quoting Crawford v. 
18 
 
La Boucherie Bernard Ltd., 815 F.2d 117, 121 (D.C. Cir. 
1987)).  An interpretation is absurd when it “defies 
rationality,” Landstar Exp. Am. v. Fed. Maritime Comm’n, 
569 F.3d 493, 498 (D.C. Cir. 2009), or renders the statute 
“nonsensical and superfluous,” Corley v. United States, 556 
U.S. 303, 314 (2009); see John F. Manning, The Absurdity 
Doctrine, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 2387, 2390 (2003) (noting that 
“standard interpretive doctrine ... defines an ‘absurd result’ as 
an outcome so contrary to perceived social values that 
Congress could not have ‘intended’ it”). 
 
 We hold that § 2253(a) does not require the 
government to prove that Fontaine lacked authorization to 
carry an imitation firearm, because, first, we do not think the 
language of the statute necessarily leads to such a 
requirement, and, second, to hold otherwise would require us 
to adopt an interpretation of the statute that yields a patently 
“absurd … result[].”  McKie, 112 F.3d at 631. 
 
As to the first point, although § 2253(a) is not a model 
of clarity, it appears that, in enacting the provision, the Virgin 
Islands legislature sought, among other things, to prohibit a 
person who is not authorized to possess firearms from 
possessing even an imitation of a firearm during the 
commission of a crime of violence.  That much emerges from 
the wording of the statute, which limits its application to 
those who are not authorized to possess firearms and which 
then goes on to provide that whoever fits that qualification 
and nevertheless possesses a “firearm” (as that term is defined 
in V.I. Code Ann. tit. 23, § 451(d)) or an “imitation thereof” 
(i.e., an object that appears to be a firearm) during the 
commission of a crime of violence has committed an offense 
punishable by a $25,000 fine and a fifteen-year term of 
19 
 
imprisonment.  The most reasonable interpretation of 
§ 2253(a) is not one that requires proof that a perpetrator 
lacks authorization to carry an imitation firearm, but rather 
one that requires proof of a lack of authorization to carry any 
“firearm,” as that term is statutorily defined.  More 
specifically, the first clause of the statute – which makes it an 
offense for a person to, “[u]nless otherwise authorized by law, 
ha[ve], possess[], [or] bear[]” a firearm – does not mention 
the term “imitation thereof.”  V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, 
§ 2253(a).  It speaks solely to authorization to carry a firearm.  
It is thus the lack of authorization to have a firearm that 
stands as a prerequisite to criminal liability for possessing an 
imitation firearm in the course of a violent crime.  Once that 
circumstance is shown, the possession of an imitation firearm, 
as much as a real one, in the course of a violent crime 
becomes punishable under the statute.13
                                              
13 The Dissent sees things differently.  It says that 
“there is no grammatical reason to distinguish between the 
two objects [firearm and imitation firearm] that might justify 
requiring authorization for the possession of one but not the 
other.”  (Dissent at 4-5.)  The view of our dissenting 
colleague is that the phrase “unless otherwise authorized” in 
the first clause of the statute “describes the statute’s subject, 
‘whoever.’” (Id. at 4.)  He goes on to say that 
“‘[w]however[,]’ is … understood as someone unauthorized.”  
(Id.)  He then says that the first clause of the statute prohibits 
the statute’s subject (“someone unauthorized”) from 
possessing a firearm, and that the third clause of the statute 
prohibits the statute’s subject from having, possessing, or 
bearing, a “firearm or an imitation thereof.”  (Id.)  Thus, he 
concludes, the government must prove that the defendant is 
not authorized to possess an imitation firearm in order to 
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prove that the defendant is guilty of possessing an imitation 
firearm during the commission of a crime of violence.  The 
short answer to that reading, however, is that the legislature 
“did not write the statute that way.”  Russello v. United 
States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  As noted above, the first clause of the statute 
speaks of authorization to have a firearm, and makes no 
mention of the term “imitation thereof.”  V.I. Code Ann. tit. 
14, § 2253(a).    
Our dissenting colleague also argues that our 
interpretation of § 2253(a) is in tension with United States v. 
Xavier, 2 F.3d 1281 (3d Cir. 2003).  He says that “in Xavier, 
we held that simple possession requires one to knowingly 
possess a firearm without authorization to possess and is a 
lesser included offense of possession during a crime of 
violence,” (Dissent at 5), and that “[f]or the Majority’s 
holding to be understood as consistent with Xavier so that 
‘each provision [does not] require[] proof of a fact which the 
other does not,’ the statute would criminalize simple 
possession of an imitation firearm,” (id. at 6 (quoting Xavier, 
2 F.3d at 1291)).  We cannot agree with that interpretation.  
First, as a matter of logic, the outlawing of one thing does not 
necessarily require the outlawing of another.  It simply does 
not follow that outlawing the possession of an imitation 
firearm during the course of a violent crime means that mere 
possession of an imitation firearm must be illegal.  Second, in 
Xavier, we suggested that the clause prohibiting possession of 
a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence is a 
“separate crime[], directed at a separate evil[]” than the clause 
prohibiting unlawful possession of a firearm generally.  See 
Xavier, 2 F.3d at 1292 n.12 (noting that clause in § 2253(a) 
which “provid[es] heavier penalties for [a defendant] who 
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In short, the Virgin Islands legislature intended to 
prohibit a person who is not authorized to carry a firearm 
from:  (1) possessing a firearm; (2) possessing a firearm 
during the commission of a crime of violence; and (3) 
possessing an imitation firearm during the commission of a 
crime of violence.  It is entirely understandable that the 
legislature would choose to punish the possession of both 
actual and imitation firearms in the course of violent crime, 
and to do so with reference to the territorial gun laws 
requiring authorization to have a firearm.  Real guns can of 
course cause injury and death, but possessing even a fake gun 
during a violent crime can have serious consequences, 
including causing the victims to fear for their lives, as 
Fontaine’s murderous threats in this case amply demonstrate.   
 
 As to the second point, even if a literal reading of the 
statute did demand the construction that Fontaine gives 
§ 2253(a), we would reject that reading because it leads to an 
absurd result.  There is no statute or regulation in the Virgin 
Islands that requires an individual to obtain authorization or 
licensure to possess an imitation firearm, so demanding proof 
of compliance with a regulatory regime that does not exist is 
                                                                                                     
uses or carries an unregistered firearm during the commission 
… of a crime of violence” is a “separate crime, directed at [a] 
separate evil[]” than the crime of unlawful possession of a 
firearm (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).  
Thus, we disagree with the Dissent’s argument that, under 
Xavier, any interpretation of § 2253(a) that outlaws 
possession of an imitation firearm during the commission of a 
crime of violence – a crime that is separate and distinct from 
possession a firearm generally – must also criminalize 
possession of an imitation firearm. 
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to demand an impossibility.  That dilemma is not resolved by 
leaning on the possibility that such a regime will be put in 
place.  It is hard to imagine that the Virgin Islands – or any 
other state or territory for that matter – would take that step, 
and Fontaine does not suggest they will.  Put simply, it 
“defies rationality” to believe that the Virgin Islands 
legislature contemplated a new program for licensing fake 
firearms – even realistic ones – and for turning Toys “R” Us 
and Kmart into regulated dealers of cap guns.14
                                              
14 Our dissenting colleague misinterprets, we believe, 
our precedent regarding statutory interpretation.  He says that 
“instead of taking the first – and, in this case what should be 
the last – step of analyzing the statute’s plain language, the 
Majority reasons that the legislature intended to prohibit only 
those persons not authorized to possess firearms from 
possessing even an imitation of a firearm during the 
commission of a crime of violence.”  (Dissent at 1-2 (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted).)  While the Dissent 
correctly notes that the “first step” “in all statutory 
construction cases,” (id. at 1), is “to determine whether the 
language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning,” (id. 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)), there is a 
reason why we take that step in the first instance:  it is to 
“discern [the legislature’s] intent,” Morgan, 466 F.3d at 277.  
Thus, if we take the first step and determine that the “literal 
application of a statute will produce a result obviously at odds 
with the intentions of its drafters,”  United States v. Ron Pair 
Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989), it is our duty to adopt 
an interpretation of the statute that does not clearly 
contravene the legislature’s intent, if such an interpretation is 
reasonably possible.  See In re Chapman, 166 U.S. at 667 
(“[N]othing is better settled than that statutes should receive a 
  We decline 
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to adopt Fontaine’s reading of § 2253(a), and instead choose 
to construe the statute as requiring only proof that the 
defendant lacks authorization to possess a firearm, rather than 
                                                                                                     
sensible construction, such as will effectuate the legislative 
intention, and, if possible, so as to avoid an unjust or an 
absurd conclusion.”). 
But, says our colleague, this is not like a “‘rare case’ 
warranting invocation of the ‘absurd results’ doctrine.”  
(Dissent at 7 (quoting Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. at 242-
43).)  He observes that “there is no legislative history 
contradicting the plain language construction [of § 2253(a)] 
or jurisprudential shift away from that construction, [or] any 
error in drafting [that can] be characterized as a 
‘typographical error’ … .”  (Dissent at 8.)  Again, we are not 
persuaded that the statute requires proof of a lack of 
authorization to possess an imitation firearm.  But, even if 
that were the most natural construction, we have never said 
that the doctrine of avoiding absurd results applies only when 
“there is no legislative history contradicting the plain 
language construction” of a statute, or there is a 
“jurisprudential shift away from that construction,” or the 
statute contains what can fairly be characterized as a 
“typographical error.”  (Id.)  We have not had to consider 
every circumstance in which the literal reading of a statute 
may end up being “absurd,” but we believe that a statute that 
creates an analytical impossibility would meet that definition 
and would require us to consider whether a sensible 
alternative reading is possible.   
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requiring proof of a lack of authorization to possess an 
imitation firearm.15
 
   
 Fontaine relies heavily on our decision in United 
States v. Daniel, 518 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2008) to support his 
statutory interpretation.  Specifically, he contends that 
because “there is no procedure by which a person may obtain 
authorization to possess an imitation firearm[, we] should 
reverse [his] Section 2253(a) conviction using the same 
reasoning [we] employed when [we] reversed the conviction 
for unauthorized possession of ammunition in Daniel.”  
(Reply Br. at 4.)  But his reliance on Daniel is misplaced. 
                                              
15 In interpreting the statute in this way, we part 
company with the District Court, which, as we have noted, 
supra, n.5, seemed to accept when ruling on Fontaine’s post-
trial Rule 29 motion that the ban on possessing imitation 
firearms in the course of a violent crime may require proof of 
a lack of authorization to possess firearms only when the 
offender is a convicted felon.  Despite what it said in its Rule 
29 decision, however, the District Court did instruct the jury 
that one of the elements the government had to prove to 
sustain the § 2253(a) charges against Fontaine is that the 
defendant was not authorized to carry a firearm or an 
imitation thereof.  (Joint App. at 345.)  Since § 2253(a) does 
not require the government to prove that a defendant is not 
authorized to possess an imitation firearm, it would have been 
preferable for the District Court’s instruction to omit the 
“imitation thereof” phrase.  However, to the extent that the 
District Court’s instruction was erroneous, any such error was 
harmless because the evidence introduced at trial showed that 
Fontaine did not have authorization to possess a firearm when 
he committed the robbery for which he was convicted. 
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 In Daniel, the defendant was convicted of unlawfully 
possessing ammunition, in violation of V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, 
§ 2256.  Section 2256 provided that “[a]ny person, who 
unless authorized by law, possesses, purchases, manufactures, 
advertises for sale or uses any firearm ammunition shall be 
guilty of a felony.”  Daniel, 518 F.3d at 207-08 (quoting V.I. 
Code Ann. tit. 14, § 2256).  At the time Daniel was decided,16
 
 
Virgin Islands law “[did] not establish a licensing 
requirement for ammunition … [n]or [did] it provide any 
specific procedure by which possession of ammunition 
[could] be licensed or otherwise authorized,” id. at 208, but 
the law did “prohibit a dealer in firearms or ammunition from 
selling ammunition to anyone without a firearms license,” id. 
(citation omitted).  The government argued that, because a 
firearms dealer could not lawfully sell ammunition to anyone 
who did not possess a firearms license, possession of 
ammunition could only be lawful if one first obtained a 
firearms license.  Since the defendant did not have a firearms 
license, the government claimed he could not lawfully – 
under § 2256 – possess ammunition.  Id.   
 We rejected the government’s argument based on our 
determination that there was “no basis for combining the 
offense of unlawful possession of ammunition … with the 
                                              
16 The statute at issue in Daniel, V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, 
§ 2256, has since been amended to more precisely define the 
prohibition on unauthorized possession, sale, advertisement 
for sale, purchase, use, or manufacture of ammunition.   
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firearm licensing provisions,” because “neither [the 
unauthorized possession of ammunition statute], nor any 
other statutory provision of which we [were] aware, ma[de] 
lawful possession of ammunition contingent on having a 
firearms license.”  Id. at 209.  Similarly, we held that the 
provision prohibiting a dealer from selling ammunition to 
anyone without a firearms license did not alter our conclusion 
because “[w]e [could] envision ways to acquire ammunition 
other than from a dealer.”  Id.  Ultimately, we held that by 
showing that the defendant was not licensed to possess a 
firearm, the government did not prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant’s possession of ammunition was 
unlawful.  Id. at 206.  We thus reversed the defendant’s 
conviction.  Id. at 209. 
 
 Daniel is distinguishable from this case in at least three 
material ways.  First, as a threshold matter, it involved an 
interpretative problem that is different than the one at issue 
here.  In Daniel, the authorization requirement in the statute 
related to a regulatory regime that did not then exist (i.e., the 
generalized regulation of ammunition), and we held that the 
government could not fix that legislative drafting error by 
roaming about in the Virgin Islands Code looking for another 
regulatory regime (i.e., the regulation of firearms) to make 
sense of the “authorized by law” requirement.  But Daniel is 
inapposite here because there is no need to reach beyond the 
applicable statute to understand or justify the authorization 
requirement we are called to interpret.  The requirement that 
one be authorized by law to possess a firearm – which relates 
to a well-established regulatory regime under Virgin Islands 
law – is in the statute itself.  Both the provision limiting the 
statute to those who are authorized to possess a firearm and 
the prohibition on possession of an imitation firearm in the 
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course of a violent crime appear together in the same 
statutory provision that Fontaine was convicted of violating.   
 
Second, the disputed criminal statute in Daniel was 
fairly susceptible to only one interpretation.  As previously 
noted, at the time Daniel was decided, V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, 
§ 2256 provided that “[a]ny person, who unless authorized by 
law, possesses … any firearm ammunition shall be guilty of a 
felony.”  Daniel, 518 F.3d at 207-08.  The only plausible 
reading of that statute was that the government had to prove 
that the accused possessed ammunition without authority to 
do so.  Here, by contrast, we are faced with a statute that is 
susceptible to two different interpretations.  Section 2253(a) 
says that “[w]hoever, unless otherwise authorized by law, … 
possesses … any firearm, as defined in Title 23, section 
451(d) of this code, … may be arrested without a warrant” 
and shall be fined and imprisoned, but it goes on to say “that 
… if such firearm or an imitation thereof was … possessed … 
during the commission or attempted commission of a crime of 
violence,” the violator is subject to more severe punishment.  
V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14, § 2253(a).  It is possible to read that 
language, as Fontaine does, as requiring the government to 
prove that someone accused of possessing an imitation 
firearm during a crime of violence is not “authorized by law” 
to do so.  But the more reasonable textual interpretation, as 
already discussed, is that the authorization requirement refers 
to authorization to possess a firearm, not an imitation firearm.   
 
Third, even though, at the time Daniel was decided, no 
Virgin Islands law required people to obtain authorization to 
possess ammunition, we did not face the same kind of absurd 
outcome Fontaine argues for here.  The only available 
interpretation of the statute at issue in Daniel, § 2256, was not 
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necessarily nonsensical because, even though Virgin Islands 
law did not then directly regulate the possession of 
ammunition, it did regulate the sale of it by firearms dealers.  
Thus, it did not “def[y] rationality,” Landstar, 569 F.3d at 
498, to allow that the legislature might move to directly 
regulate possession.  Indeed, when the Virgin Islands 
legislature enacted § 2256, there were already numerous state 
and federal laws governing the possession of ammunition.  
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922(d), (g) (1968) (prohibiting the 
possession of ammunition by persons who, among other 
things, are (1) under indictment for a crime punishable by 
more than 1 year of imprisonment, (2) unlawful users of a 
controlled substance, or (3) illegal aliens); see generally Ill. 
Rev. Stat. ch. 38, § 24-3.1 (regulating possession of 
ammunition); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 140, § 129C(1) (1973) 
(same).  By contrast, Fontaine has pointed to no law that 
requires licensure of an imitation firearm; we are not aware of 
any such law; and we are hard-pressed to imagine that any is 
in the offing. 
 
 We thus reject  Fontaine’s challenge to his conviction 
based on the assertion that the government failed to prove that 
he was not authorized to possess an imitation firearm.  See 
Dowd v. United Steelworkers of Am., Local No. 286, 253 F.3d 
1093, 1099 (8th Cir. 2001) (“When the meaning of a statute is 
questionable, it should be given a sensible construction and 
construed to effectuate the underlying purposes of the law.” 
(quoting United States v. McAllister, 225 F.3d 982, 986 (8th 
Cir. 2000))); United States v. Alaniz, 235 F.3d 386, 389 (8th 
Cir. 2000) (acknowledging “duty to give an ambiguous 
statute a sensible construction”); Burns v. Stone Forest Indus., 
Inc., 147 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 1998) (“We should not 
choose a construction of ambiguous statutory language that 
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would attribute irrationality to Congress, where the words 
also lend themselves to a sensible construction.”). 
 
III. Conclusion 
 
 In sum, we hold that § 2253(a) is not void for 
vagueness because it puts a person of ordinary intelligence on 
notice that it prohibits Fontaine’s conduct in this case.  In 
addition, we hold that, to prove a defendant guilty of 
possessing an imitation firearm “during the commission or 
attempted commission of a crime of violence,” V.I. Code 
Ann. tit. 14, § 2253(a), the government must show that the 
defendant lacks authorization to possess a firearm but need 
not show that the defendant lacks authorization to possess an 
imitation firearm.  Accordingly, we will affirm Fontaine’s 
conviction and sentence. 
United States v. Fontaine,  No. 11-2602, dissenting in part 
and in the judgment. 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 I join the majority opinion regarding whether 14 V.I.C. 
§ 2253(a) is unconstitutionally vague. (Maj. Op. 11-15.)  I 
respectfully dissent, however, with regard to the Majority’s 
disposition of the other issues raised by the defendant. The 
unambiguous plain language of  14 V.I.C. § 2253(a) requires 
the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant was unauthorized to possess an imitation firearm 
and evidence that the defendant did not have a license to 
possess a firearm did not meet the government’s burden of 
proof on this issue.   As a result, I would reverse the judgment 
of the District Court. 
 
(a) Authorization to Possess an Imitation Firearm 
 
“The first step” “in all statutory construction cases” is 
“‘to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and 
unambiguous meaning.’” Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., Inc., 
534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002) (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 
519 U.S. 337, 340 (1997)). “‘When the words of a statute are 
unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: “judicial 
inquiry is complete.”’” Barnhardt, 534 U.S. at 462 (quoting 
Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-254 
(1992) (quoting Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 
(1981)) (citations omitted)).  
 
The language of 14 V.I.C. § 2253(a) is unambiguous 
and susceptible to only one interpretation.  But instead of 
taking the first—and, in this case what should be the last—
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step of analyzing the statute’s plain language, the Majority 
reasons that the legislature intended to prohibit only those 
persons “not authorized to possess firearms from possessing 
even an imitation of a firearm during the commission of a 
crime of violence.” (Maj. Op. 18.)  Notably, there is no 
evidence of this legislative intent on which the Majority’s 
conclusion is premised; indeed, it is as likely that that the 
legislature intended to criminalize brandishing an imitation 
firearm during the commission of a violence crime without 
reference to whether an individual is authorized to possess an 
actual firearm. Nevertheless, in an effort to realize this 
purported legislative intent, and to avoid what they 
characterize as an “absurd result” at odds with it, the Majority 
reads the statute as requiring proof of “lack of authorization 
to have a firearm . . . [for] criminal liability for possessing an 
imitation firearm in the course of a violent crime.” (Maj. Op. 
19.)  The Majority attempts to ground their conclusion in the 
statutory language, stating that the unauthorization element 
appears in the first clause of the statute and the term 
“imitation thereof” does not.  Therefore, according to the 
Majority, the statute can be interpreted as requiring proof that 
someone is unauthorized to possess a firearm when 
possessing an imitation during the commission of a violent 
crime.  
 
The Majority’s construction ignores the plain language 
grammatical structure of the statute.  The statute does not 
state “Whoever, unless otherwise authorized by law to have, 
possess, bear . . . a firearm, has possesses, bears . . . .”  Had 
it so stated, the Majority’s reading might be a legitimate plain 
language construction.  In drafting the statute, however, the 
legislature chose not to link the authorization requirement 
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with possession of a firearm specifically.  Title 14, Section 
2253(a) of the Virgin Islands Code, provides as follows: 
 
Whoever, unless otherwise 
authorized by law, has, 
possesses, bears, transports or 
carries either, actually or 
constructively, openly or 
concealed any firearm, as 
defined in Title 23, section 451(d) 
of this code, loaded or unloaded, 
may be arrested without a 
warrant, and shall be sentenced to 
imprisonment of not less than one 
year nor more than five years and 
shall be fined not less than $5,000 
nor more than $15,000 or both the 
fine and imprisonment, except 
that if such person shall have 
been convicted of a felony in any 
state, territory, or federal court of 
the United States, or if such 
firearm or an imitation thereof 
was had, possessed, borne, 
transported or carried by or under 
the proximate control of such 
person during the commission or 
attempted commission of a crime 
of violence, as defined in 
subsection (d) hereof, then such 
person shall be fined $25,000 and 
imprisoned not less than fifteen 
(15) years nor more than twenty 
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(20) years. The foregoing 
applicable penalties provided for 
violation of this section shall be in 
addition to the penalty provided 
for the commission of, or attempt 
to commit, the felony or crime of 
violence. 
 
14 V.I.C. § 2253(a) (emphasis added).  “Unless otherwise 
authorized” is a modifying phrase set apart by commas and 
does not refer to that which must be authorized.  Under a 
plain language construction, that which must be authorized is 
understood in the context of the conduct targeted by the 
particular clause.  In the first clause, the conduct that must be 
unauthorized for criminal liability is possession of a firearm; 
in the third clause, the relevant clause here, the conduct is 
possession of a firearm or imitation thereof.  
 
“Unless otherwise authorized” describes the statute’s 
subject, “whoever.”  The word “unless” denotes an exception 
to the subject contemplated by “whoever.” “Whoever” is 
therefore understood as someone unauthorized.  The third 
clause refers to “such person,” the statute’s subject, or 
“whoever.”  Substituting the understanding of “whoever” as 
someone unauthorized, the relevant statutory clause would 
read “or if such firearm or an imitation thereof was had, 
possessed, borne, transported or carried by or under the 
proximate control of someone unauthorized [to 
have/possess/bear  it] during the commission or attempted 
commission of a crime of violence . . . .”   Unlike in the first 
clause, which is limited to the possession of firearms, in the 
third clause, the objects of  “ha[ve], possess[], [bear] . . . ”are 
a “firearm and an imitation thereof.”  And there is no 
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grammatical reason to distinguish between the two objects 
that might justify requiring authorization for the possession of 
one but not the other.  Because the requirement that the 
government prove the individual was unauthorized attaches to 
the subject of the statute and is in reference to the targeted 
conduct in the particular subsection, the plain language 
statutory construction unambiguously requires the 
government to show that the person was unauthorized to 
possess a firearm or imitation thereof.   Accord United States 
v. McKie, 112 F.3d 626, 629 (3d Cir. 1997) (it is the 
government’s burden to prove that defendants were 
unauthorized to carry or possess); Government of Virgin 
Islands v. Bedford, 671 F.2d 758, 763 n. 7 (3d Cir.1982) 
(approving a jury instruction that § 2253(a) is violated if, “the 
defendant possessed the firearm; ... he was not licensed 
[authorized] to possess it; and ... it meets the definition ... of a 
firearm.”).  
 
 Moreover, our prior analysis of the language of 14 
V.I.C. § 2253(a), albeit in the context of a Double Jeopardy 
challenge, is instructive. United States v. Xavier, 2 F.3d 1281, 
1290-91 (3d Cir. 1993).  In Xavier, we held that simple 
possession requires one to knowingly possess a firearm 
without authorization to possess and is a lesser included 
offense of possession during a crime of violence; the Double 
Jeopardy Clause, therefore, prevented imposing separate 
sentences for possession and possession during the 
commission of a violent crime.  We stated that “[c]onviction 
for possession during a crime of violence under § 2253(a) 
requires proof of three elements: one must 1) knowingly 
possess a firearm 2) without authorization 3) during a crime 
of violence.” Xavier, 2 F.3d at 1291.  The statute was meant 
to mandate minimum and maximum sentences for simple 
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unauthorized possession, “except that if” certain additional 
circumstances were present, a greater sentence is mandated. 
Xavier, 2 F.3d at 1291. In reaching this conclusion, we did 
not parse the phrase “or if such firearm or an imitation thereof 
was had . . .,” and, as already stated, there is no structural or 
grammatical reason to distinguish within it. In accord with 
Xavier, when an imitation firearm is at issue, the statute 
would require that “one must 1) knowingly possess [an 
imitation] firearm 2) without authorization 3) during a crime 
of violence.” 
 
As we decided in Xavier, the plain language of 14 
V.I.C. § 2253(a) establishes that possession during a crime of 
violence contains elements that simple possession does not 
contain, but the reverse is not true.  All of the elements for the 
crime of simple possession are included in possession during 
a crime of violence.  For the Majority’s holding to be 
understood as consistent with Xavier so that “‘each provision 
[does not] require[] proof of a fact which the other does not,’” 
Id. at 1291 (quoting with alterations Blockberger v. United 
States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932)),  the statute would 
criminalize simple possession of an imitation firearm.  Like 
the possession of a firearm in Xavier, possession of an 
imitation firearm would be the lesser included offense of 
possession during a violent crime.  Considering that the term 
“imitation firearm” is without limitation, the Majority’s 
holding, when viewed in conjunction with our precedent, 
criminalizes the simple possession of a toy pistol—a truly 
“absurd result.”  There is nothing that would suggest that the 
Virgin Islands legislature intended the statute sweep so 
broadly.  And, in response to the defendant’s Constitutional 
vagueness challenge, the government argues the opposite.  Of 
course, “the outlawing of one thing does not necessarily 
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require the outlawing of another” (Maj. Op. n. 13), but an 
interpretation of the Majority’s holding that criminalizes only 
the type of conduct at issue in this case—and excludes 
criminalization of simple possession of an imitation firearm—
undermines our holding in Xavier by imposing a construction 
in which “each provision requires proof of a fact which the 
other does not.”  Criminalizing behavior and prescribing 
punishments are strictly within the purview of the legislature.  
Here, the Majority usurps that role and simultaneously 
undermines our precedent. 
 
Because I conclude that the statutory language is plain 
and unambiguous, I do not agree with the Majority that this 
case requires employing alternate tools of statutory 
interpretation.  United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 
U.S. 235, 242-43 (1989).  But, even conceding that 14 V.I.C. 
§ 2253(a)’s plain language construction leads to an unusual 
result of requiring the government to prove an element that 
might be impossible to prove, I do not agree that this is a 
“rare case” warranting invocation of the “absurd results” 
doctrine. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. at 242-43 (“The 
plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive, except in 
the ‘rare cases [in which] the literal application of a statute 
will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions 
of its drafters.’”) (alteration in original) (emphasis added).  
 
The cases from our Circuit cited by the Majority 
illustrate the type of  “rare case” in which we have 
disregarded the unambiguous plain language construction of 
the statute. For example, in Morgan v. Gay, 466 F.3d 276, 
277 (3d Cir. 2006), we concluded that the statute contained a 
typographical error; instead of “not less than 7 days” the 
statute should have stated “not more than 7 days” to appeal a 
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remand order.  In so limiting the time for an appeal, we relied 
on the fact that the plain language reading of the statute was 
directly contrary to the legislative history.  And in 
Government of the Virgin Islands v. Berry, 604 F.2d 221, 
225-26 (3d Cir. 1979), we limited liability under a kidnapping 
statute by requiring that violations of the statute be analyzed 
with reference to four factors because potential liability was 
limitless under the literal meaning of the statutory language.  
We stated that this was consistent with “the modern approach 
[] to construe the kidnapping statutes so as ‘to prevent gross 
distortion of lesser crimes into a much more serious crime by 
excess of prosecutorial zeal’” and warranted in light of the 
mandatory life sentence and the absence of legislative history 
to the contrary.1
 
  
Neither of these cases is analogous to the result of a 
plain language construction of 14 V.I.C. § 2253(a).  Here, 
there is no legislative history contradicting the plain language 
construction or jurisprudential shift away from that 
construction, any error in drafting cannot be characterized as 
a “typographical error,” and the interpretation urged by the 
Majority expands the scope of the conduct targeted by the 
                                              
1 The additional case from our Circuit cited by the 
majority is Coar v. Kazimir, 990 F.2d 1413, 1419-20 (3d Cir. 
1993).  Coar is inapplicable in resolving the issues before us 
because it did not address whether an unambiguous plain 
language construction of the statute should be abandoned. We 
reconciled one section of ERISA with another seemingly 
inconsistent section by finding a reading “consistent with the 
purposes of the entire statute considered as a whole.” 
(citations omitted).  
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statute and enhances the sentence, as opposed to limiting it.  
Indeed, in United States v. Daniel, 518 F.3d 205, 208 (3d Cir. 
2008), the precise result of 14 V.I.C. § 2253(a), which the 
Majority believes “creates an analytical impossibility,” (Maj. 
Op. n. 14) was not so “absurd” as to require us to read the 
unauthorized element out of the statute.  Further, each of the 
results of the Majority’s holding highlighted above is as 
“absurd” as requiring the government to prove an element of 
a sentence enhancement statute.  Under the guise of avoiding 
an “absurd result” the Majority invites others by ignoring the 
statute’s sentence enhancement purpose, criminalizing 
behavior not addressed by the Virgin Islands Code, and 
violating basic canons of statutory construction.  
 
 (b) Sufficient Proof of Unauthorization 
In concluding that the government was required to 
prove that the defendant was unauthorized to possess an 
imitation firearm, I next address whether the government met 
its burden.  Because I conclude that evidence that the 
defendant was unauthorized to possess a firearm is not 
sufficient, I would reverse the District Court’s judgment.  
 
We have interpreted “unless authorized by law” to 
mean “possession without a license.” Daniel, 518 F.3d at 208; 
McKie, 112 F.3d at 630.  Here, however, similar to in Daniel, 
Virgin Islands law does not provide for the licensing of 
imitation firearms. Applying the same reasoning used in 
Daniel, we cannot “construe the clause ‘unless otherwise 
authorized by law’ . . . as meaning ‘unless possessing a 
license to possess [an imitation firearm].’” Daniel, 518 F.3d 
at 208.  The question is then whether evidence that the 
defendant was unlicensed to possess a firearm is evidence, 
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beyond a reasonable doubt, that he was unauthorized to 
possess an imitation firearm. 
 
In Daniel, the defendant was convicted of 
unauthorized possession of ammunition. Virgin Islands law 
did not provide for any procedure for licensing ammunition 
possession.  The government argued that proof that the 
defendant did not have a firearms license was proof that the 
ammunition possession was unauthorized because dealers 
were prohibited from selling ammunition to anyone without a 
firearms license.  Daniel 518 F.3d at 208.  Although 
acknowledging that ammunition is generally possessed for 
use in a firearm, we were “loath to construe these provisions 
to create an offense relating to unlawful possession of 
ammunition” because no statutory provision made “lawful 
possession of ammunition contingent on having a firearms 
license.” Id. at 208-209. Further, the provision prohibiting 
dealers from selling ammunition to persons without firearms 
licenses restricted only the conduct of dealers, not an 
individual’s possession. Id. 
 
 In accord with Daniel, absence of a license to possess 
a firearm cannot be proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant was unauthorized to possess an imitation firearm.  
In this case, there is nothing that regulates an imitation 
firearm at all, let alone with regard to an individual’s 
possession.  And nothing links authorization to possess a 
firearm to authorization to possess an imitation.  The breadth 
of the term “imitation,” which is undefined in the statute, 
makes drawing a link nearly impossible.  Since the only proof 
the government offers that the defendant was unauthorized to 
possess the imitation is the absence of a license to possess a 
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firearm, the government has failed to meet its burden of 
proof. 
 
 Because I believe that the government failed to prove a 
requisite element of 14 V.I.C. § 2253(a), I respectfully dissent 
from the Majority’s judgment insofar as it holds otherwise.  
Accordingly, I would reverse the District Court’s July 22, 
2011 judgment. 
